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FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION LAWS: A
CRITICAL LACK OF ENFORCEMENT BY
THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has recently come
under attack for curtailing enforcement of environmental laws.
Congress, the Justice Departmen and environmental groups
have pressed for investigations of the EPA's handling of hazard-
ous waste cleanup. Enforcement problems in the EPA, however,
are not limited to hazardous waste or to the current administra-
tion. The problems in enforcement are rooted in the EPA's discre-
tionary power not to enforce. This discretionary power has
resulted in a critical lack of enforcement in the federal govern-
ment's attempts to clean up the nation's waters.
INTRODUCTION
The rise of the environmental movement and extensive public-
ity of pollution problems during the 1970's prompted Congress' to
strengthen the laws2 protecting the nation's air and water re-
sources. One of the most important of these laws is the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA).3
The 1972 Amendments to the FWPCA mandated drastic and im-
mediate changes in water pollution control strategy.4 Congress'
1. See H. LIEBER, FEDERALISM AND CLEAN WATERS 16 (1975).
2. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act, Pub. I No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1271-1287 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)).
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)). This 1972 legislation is the basis for federal water pollution control meth-
ods today.
4. The most recent major revisions to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act were enacted in 1977. Clean Air Act of 1977, Pub. L No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1981)).
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stated objective was to "restore and maintain the chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."5 To achieve
this goal, Congress delegated substantial enforcement powers to
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to reduce dis-
charges of pollutants into the waters of the United States. 6 A pro-
vision allowing citizens to sue the EPA to require enforcement
was also included.7
Unfortunately, these enforcement provisions have not become
the weapons against water pollution that Congress intended.
United States Geological Survey statistics show that there has
been little change in the national water quality since 1975.8 In
fact there has been an increase in certain pollutants such as mer-
cury and total phosphorous. 9 The impact of pollutants such as
these is immense. Synthetic chemicals and pesticides are con-
taminating drinking water 0 and entering food chains." Certain
industries such as commercial shellfishing have been damaged by
closures of coastal waters due to pollution.12
Although Congress has allocated billions of dollars for technical
research and complex monitoring systems to solve these pollution
problems,13 widespread noncompliance by both industrial and
municipal dischargers continues. EPA legal enforcement, how-
ever, has decreased, as demonstrated by the dramatic drop in
abatement orders and civil suits filed.14 During the same period
the courts have limited the citizen's ability to sue either the viola-
tor for damages' 5 or the EPA to require enforcement.16
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
6. While there are several enforcement remedies included in the Federal
Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA), this Comment will con-
centrate on those legal remedies provided to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in section 309(a) (3) and to private citizens in section 505. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319 (a) (3), 1365 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
7. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976).
8. See CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 1982, at 97
(1982).
9. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrY, ENVIRONMENT 1981: 12TH ANNUAL RE-
PORT 247 (1981).
10. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1982, § 1, at 1, coL 6. "An Environmental Protec-
tion Agency report says that thousands of pits, ponds, and lagoons around the
country contain waste that poses serious threats of groundwater contamination
.... For many communities water supplies are drawn from groundwater." Id.
11. See L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1983, § 1, at 2, coL 8. (raw oysters from a polluted
river in Massachusetts sickened up to 100 people).
12. See CoUNcIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 9, at 63-64. Statistics
"show that most of the 22 [coastal] states had 10 to 25 percent of their active shell-
fish harvesting areas closed at all times." Id at 64.
13. Id. at 255. Federal expenditures for water quality control amounted to
over four billion dollars per year from 1977 to 1979.
14. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text
15. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 73-89 and accompanying text
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Problems that have plagued other government agencies,17 such
as administrative delay and industry influence, have certainly di-
minished the EPA's overall effectiveness.18 However, it is the
EPA's immense discretionary power not to enforce that is key to
the EPA's unwillingness to make dischargers comply with federal
standards. Although the federal role in water pollution control
has increased greatly, there is a pressing need for even tougher
enforcement standards.
This Comment will trace the federal role in water pollution en-
forcement and critique the discretionary powers of the EPA to re-
frain from enforcing the current water pollution laws. The
effectiveness of the citizen suit provision and the viability of alter-
natives to EPA enforcement will also be examined. Finally, this
Comment will outline a proposal to strengthen enforcement of the
FWPCA by limiting discretionary enforcement.
STATUTORY HISTORY
Until the 1972 amendments, the federal role in the effort to con-
trol water pollution was "limited to support of the assistance to
the states."' 9 Congress first responded to water pollution by en-
acting the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948.20 This leg-
islation authorized the federal government to supply the states
with technical research and financial assistance for the construc-
tion of municipal treatment facilities.21 Federal authorities were
also authorized to assist the states in enforcement duties. The
1948 Act, however, lacked any strong enforcement provision.
The federal authorities' only remedy for violations was to sue
for abatement of a public nuisance. Only interstate pollution
could be abated, and then only after a long and complex adminis-
trative procedure was exhausted. For example, an alleged viola-
tor was allowed two notifications, a public hearing, and an
opportunity to respond and negotiate before a suit could be
17. Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 COLuM. L
REv. 429 (1960) (Judge Friendly identifies several of the problems federal agencies
face such as delay and special interest pressure).
18. See Hileman, Enforcement by the EPA, ENviL. SCL AND TEcH., Feb. 1983, at
72A-75A.
19. See H. LIEBER, supra note 1, at 11.
20. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (current
version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
21. Id. at 1158.
ffled.22
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 195623
attempted to expand federal anti-pollution efforts by establishing
a federal-state partnership. The 1956 Act authorized the federal
government to convene a conference at. which a violator and fed-
eral and state enforcement agencies could discuss and solve pol-
lution problems. Six months later the administrator of the
FWPCA could finally request the Attorney General to sue the
violator.24
The three stages---conference, hearing, and finally, court ac-
tion-proved time-consuming and complicated.25 Between 1965
and 1971 only 53 conferences were initiated and only 4 cases were
even considered by the hearing board.26
THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
After two years of intense consideration 27 Congress passed the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.28 Con-
gress declared that "it is the national goal that the discharge of
pollutants into navigable waters be eliminated by 1985."29 In fur-
therance of this goal, the federal program for water pollution was
totally restructured. The 1972 amendments supplemented the
prior acts' water quality standards with specific effluent limita-
tions3O and established a national system of discharge permits.31
Responding to the "almost total lack of enforcement"3 2 of ear-
lier abatement procedures, the 1972 amendments instituted a vari-
ety of new enforcement remedies. Under the 1972 amendments,
the EPA has broad emergency powers to seek an immediate in-
junction against any source of pollution which presents substan-
22. Id. at 1156.
23. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, ch. 518, 70 Stat. 498 (cur-
rent version at 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
24. Id. at 504.
25. See Note, Federal Enforcement of Individual and Corporate Liability for
Water Pollution, 10 MEA. ST. U.L. REV. 576, 580-81 (1980).
26. Id.
27. ENvmOAENrAL POLICY DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CON-
TROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1265 (Comm. Print. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The Senate Public Works Committee held 33 days of pub-
lic hearings, which resulted in 6,400 pages of testimony from 171 witnesses and 470
additional written statements.
28. Pub. I No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1) (1976).
30. Id. § 1311 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
31. See id, §§ 1341-1345.
32. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 27, at 1423.
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tial danger to health and welfare.3 3 In addition, these
amendments address several problems such as hazardous waste
that were not covered by prior legislation.3 4
Section 309-Abatement Orders and Civil Penalties
Congress gave the EPA substantial punitive powers in response
to "sanctions under existing law [that] have not been sufficient to
encourage compliance with the provisions of the [FWCPA]."35
Section 309 gives the EPA a variety of enforcement options when
a discharger is in violation of permit conditions of other effluent
limitations set out in the FWCPA.36 If the EPA discovers a viola-
tion it may defer to the appropriate state authority or, if that state
does not initiate enforcement within thirty days, the EPA may in-
itiate its own enforcement procedures. 37 Additionally, the EPA
may commence a criminal action if the violation has been willful
or negligent.38
While section 309 as a whole contains the Act's most important
enforcement provisions, section 309(a) (3) enumerates what are
probably its most direct and effective methods of enforcement.39
This section provides that whenever the Administrator of the
EPA discovers a violation "he shall issue an order requiring such
person to comply with such section or requirement, or he shall
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (Supp. V 1981).
34. Id. § 1321 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (civil and criminal penalties may be im-
posed upon dumpers of oil and hazardous waste); id. § 1342(h) (Supp. V 1981)
(municipal treatment plant operators who violate the Act may be restricted or pro-
hibited from making new sewer connections).
35. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 27, at 1482.
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. V 1981). For a summary of the various enforcement
provisions available under the FWPCA, see Ipsen & Raisch, Enforcement Under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 9 LpN & WATER L. REv.
369 (1974).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (2) (Supp. V 1981).
38. Id. § 1319(c).
39. Id. § 1319(a) (3). Section 309(a) (3) states:
Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Ad-
ministrator finds that any person is in violation of section 1311, 1312,
1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title, or is in violation of any permit
condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit
issued under section 1342 of this title by him or by a State or in a per-
mit issued under section 1344 of this title by a State, he shall issue an
order requiring such person to comply with such section or require-
ment, or he shall bring a civil action in accordance with subsection
(b) of this section.
bring a civil action" for "appropriate relief."40 Section 309(a) (3) is
direct in that an abatement order can be issued "immediately"
without a hearing, a conference, or other delays.41 It is effective
because civil penalties can be used to -deter polluters and com-
pensate government cleanup outlays.42 .
Section 505-Citizen Suits
Congress further expanded the Act's enforcement potential by
giving enforcement power not only to the EPA, but also to private
citizens. Under section 505, citizens can bring suits:
1) against any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an ef-
fluent standard... or (B) an order issued by the Administrator...
or
2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Ad-
ministrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator. 43
By allowing private citizens to enforce the FWPCA, Congress
encouraged them to fight aggressively against pollution44 and pro-
vided the EPA help in monitoring violators.
Section 505 requires sixty-days' notice before a private action is
commenced and restricts citizens from filing a separate suit if the
EPA or a state agency has already commenced suit against the vi-
olator.45 The legislative intent was evidently that the EPA or
state officials should have the primary enforcement role. The
Senate Report states that the citizen-suit provision was intended
only to supplement section 309 when federal agencies had "failed
to exercise their enforcement responsibilities."4 6
WHO CAN ENFORCE THE FWPCA?
Theoretically there are three groups who can enforce the stan-
dards and limitations outlined in the FWPCA. 1) the state gov-
ernments; 2) the federal government; and 3) private citizens.
The drafters of the FWPCA said that the states should retain
the primary responsibility of enforcing the Act.47 However, sev-
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., State of Mich. v. City of Allen Park, 501 F. Supp. 1007, 1016 (ED.
Mich. 1980).
42. See Comment, The Use of Civil Penalties in Enforcing Clean Water Act
Amendments of 1977, 12 .U.S.F. REv. 437, 445 (1978).
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976).
44. See LEGISLATIvE ISTORY, supra note 27, at 1498. "It is the Committee's in-
tent.., that citizens should be unconstrained to bring these actions .... " Id.
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1976).
46. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 27, at 1498.
47. 'The Committee again, however, notes that the authority of the Federal
Government should be used judiciously by the Administration in those cases de-
serve [sic] Federal action because of their national character, scope or serious-
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eral state officials and close observers agree that Congress in-
tended the EPA to be "in the driver's seat."48 Many states are
unable to enforce the national standards of FWPCA for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, only states with EPA-approved permit pro-
grams may initiate enforcement against permit violators.49
Second, regional political concerns, such as desire to attract in-
dustry, often prevent stringent enforcement. 0 Finally, pollution
does not respect political boundaries and jurisdictions.
The enforcement role then falls on the federal government,
through the EPA's Office of Legal and Enforcement Counsel
(OLEC), and on private citizens. Unfortunately, the EPA refuses
to enforce the law and citizens are being frustrated in their en-
forcement actions by the courts.
The EPA-Enforcement Is Down
In 1978 the General Accounting Office (GAO) prepared a report
on EPA enforcement of industrial compliance with discharge per-
mits. The report found that delays in issuing abatement orders
and referring civil actions to the Justice Department inhibited en-
forcement. The GAO also commented that EPA monitoring of
permit violators was not aggressive.51
In 1982 the GAO again reported on the EPA's enforcement ac-
tivities. Although not taking a stance on the overall effectiveness
of the EPA, the report did note that reorganizations have dis-
rupted the EPA's enforcement function and presented figures
showing a sharp drop in enforcement since 1978.52 Statistics gath-
ered by the EPA's Office of Legal and Enforcement Counsel con-
firm that EPA water pollution enforcement is ineffective.53
ness. The Committee intends the great volume of enforcement action be brought
by the States." Id. at 1482.
48. See IL LIEBER, supra note 1, at 8-10.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h) (Supp. V 1981).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 117.19.
51. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MORE EFFECrVE ACTION By THE EPA
NEEDED To ENFORCE INDUsTEIAL COMPLIANCE wrn WATER POLLTION CONTROL
DISCHARGE PERIrs 18, 26 (1978).
52. Letter from Henry Eschwege, U.S. General Accounting Office, to Represen-
tative John Dingell (April 1, 1982) (information on the EPA's enforcement
activities).
53. Administrative abatement orders, which numbered 1,238 in 1977, dropped
to 562 in 1981, and 329 in 1982. The EPA, which had referred an average of 106
cases to the Department of Justice from 1977 thru 1979, referred only 35 in 1981,
and 58 in 1982. Through June 1, 1983, only 17 cases have been referred. Letter
Lack of recent enforcement is all the more critical because
widespread violations continue. Industry often sees compliance
with pollution standards as harmful to profits; therefore abate-
ment only takes place if spurred by government action.54 Studies
by the GAO "have shown a high incidence of noncompliance with
established water pollution limits on the part of both industrial
and municipal sources."5
5
The legal enforcement office's poor record is due to three major
problems: poor organization, lack of internal standards, and a
substantial discretionary power not to enforce.
Poor Organization. One reason for EPA's enforcement
problems is the mismanagement of the agency's enforcement di-
vision. A report to Congress by the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee notes that during the four reorganizations of the EPA in
1980 and 1981 there were often only ten attorneys in the enforce-
ment division of the Office of Legal Enforcement (OLEC). The
committee report concludes that "the effectiveness of the enforce-
ment division was virtually destroyed by a combination of mis-
management and mixed signals."5
6
Lack of Standards. In addition to having organizational
problems, EPA management has failed to produce consistent or
complete policy guidelines. A reorganization of the enforcement
division was announced on June 12, 1981,57 yet it was not until
July 6, 1982, that final OLEC operating procedures were even pub-
lished.58 In the meantime attorneys at regional offices and at the
Washington headquarters were without guidelines because the
reorganization superseded all other policies.
The EPA still has not issued specific guidelines on enforcement
policy.5 9 In a memo since rescinded, a former director of OLEC
from John S. Winder, Jr., Ass't Enforcement Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, to Edward E. Yates (July 7, 1983) (on Me with the University of San
Diego Law Review).
54. See D. Zwzcx & M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTEAiN 39 (1972).
55. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CLEANING UP THE ENVIRONMENT' PRO-
GRESS ACHIEVED BUT MAJOR UNRESOLVED IssuEs REMAIN 46 (1982). A New Jersey
public interest group examined the discharger monitoring reports of 158 discharg-
ers in EPA Region II and found 4,327 violations. The EPA responded to a mere 13
percent of those violations, by issuing just 21 administrative orders and 5 referrals
to the Department of Justice. Id. at 47.
56. 128 CONG. REc. S8849 (daily ed. July 21, 1982) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
57. Letter from Henry Eschwege, U.S. General Accounting Office, to Represen-
tative John Dingell (April 1, 1982) (information on the EPA's enforcement
activities).
58. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Memorandum on General Operat-
ing Procedures for the Civil Enforcement Program from Robert M. Perry, Associ-
ate Administrator (1982) [hereinafter cited as General Operating Procedures].
59. Telephone interview with Chris Dunsky, Water Compliance Division, Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (Feb. 22, 1983).
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said that policies for issuing notices of violations and administra-
tive orders were under development. 60 An attorney in charge of
regional water pollution enforcement stated recently that there
are currently no policies for issuing notices of violations and ad-
ministrative orders. 61 The regional attorney also said there were
no regional policies on enforcement, nor were there any require-
ments to explain or give reasons for a decision not to prosecute.
When regional counsel are without policy guidance, the poten-
tial arises for unequal treatment of violators.62 Also, regional
counsel left with no guidance will often choose not to act rather
than risk taking the wrong action. One EPA program official con-
firmed that the attorneys, as a result of "confusing signals," were
"reluctant to take enforcement action."63
Power Not to Enforce. Federal agencies such as the EPA are
subject to great pressures from industry and special interests. 64
These pressures sometimes result in agencies becoming the ann
of industries they are supposed to regulate.65 A major problem in
water pollution control is the "vast economic and political power"
of the larger polluters.66 The general de-emphasis in current EPA
water pollution control is shown by the EPA's proposed budget-
cuts of ninety million dollars from water quality programs in
fiscal 1982.67
The particular de-emphasis on water pollution control in the le-
gal enforcement office is shown by the drop in suits filed amid ex-
tensive noncompliance. 68 Even where legislative pressure
69 is
60. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Memorandum on Enforcement
Policies and Procedures from Enforcement Counsel William Sullivan to Regional
Administrators, Attachment L (Feb. 26, 1982).
61. Telephone interview with Mary Ann Muirhead, Assistant Regional Coun-
sel, Region IX, Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 28, 1982).
62. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.1, at 218 (1979). "Discretion-
ary power not to enforce is the power to discriminate." Id.
63. Letter from Henry Eschwege, U.S. General Accounting Office to Represen-
tative John Dingell (April 1, 1982) (information on EPA's enforcement activities).
64. See Friendly, supra note 17, at 438.
65. J. GALBEArH, THE GREAT CRASH 171 (1955).
66. D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK, supra note 54, at 395. Zwick and Benstock had
previously given an example of this power by citing the names of several powerful
corporations dumping waste into Lake Erie from greater Detroit such as Ford Mo-
tor Company, Scott Paper and Firestone Tire and Rubber.
67. Conflict Over the EPA Budget, NAT'L J., Aug. 15, 1981, at 1468.
68. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
69. Congress has scheduled several hearings concerning EPA enforcement ac-
tivities. See House Panels, Gorsuch Debate Record of EPA During Reagan Admin-
istration, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 419, 420 (July 30, 1982).
placed on the EPA to enforce, EPA officials still retain the discre-
tionary power not to enforce. Lack of a mandatory enforcement
provision has left EPA administrators and attorneys free to ignore
violations of pollution standards.
Section 309 of the FWPCA provides: "Whenever ... the Ad-
ministrator finds that a person is in violation... he shall issue an
order .. . or he shall bring a civil action."70 Although the lan-
guage "shall" appears to be mandatory, several courts 71 have
found that powers to issue abatement orders and file suits are dis-
cretionary.72 These decisions reaffirming the EPA's discretionary
power also prevent citizens from suing the EPA to require
enforcement.
Courts Diminish Citizen Role
Despite the seemingly plain statutory language,73 courts disa-
gree when asked to decide whether Congress intended enforce-
ment under section 309 to be mandatory or discretionary.7 4 The
interpretation of the words "shall order" is extremely important
because citizens can only file suits to force the EPA to act if the
Administrator's duty to act is not discretionary.75
In Sierra Club v. Train,7 6 the plaintiffs ified a suit against the
Administrator of the EPA to compel him to issue a compliance or-
der to two companies polluting a creek. The court held that the
Administrator's duties to issue abatement orders and sue viola-
tors were discretionary and not subject to review by plaintiffs.
A year later, in South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Alexan-
der,7 7 a district court rejected the Train court's rationale and held
that the Administrator's duty to issue orders is mandatory. The
South Carolina Wildlife decision required the Administrator to
issue an abatement order to the Corps of Engineers to comply
with section 301 of the FWCPA.
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (3) (Supp. V 1981).
71. Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F,2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977); Caldwell v. Gurley Refin-
ing Co., 553 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Ark. 1982); see also City of Seabrook v. Costle, 659
F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1981) (court denied citizens the right to sue under a parallel
citizen suit provision in the Clean Air Act).
72. "Most federal regulatory statutes... [reject] compulsory prosecution." 2
K. DAviS, supra note 62, § 9.5, at 233.
73, Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935) (" 'shall' is the language of com-
mand"). For a discussion of mandatory statutory language, see 1A C. SANDS,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 25.04 at 301-03 (4th ed. 1973).
74. South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 132 (D.S.C.
1978).
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2) (1976).
76. 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977).
77. 457 F. Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1978).
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The South Carolina Wildlife court examined legislative intent
more closely than did the Train court. The Train court empha-
sized the technical wording of the statute to conclude that the
duty to act is discretionary.
However, even the statutory interpretation of Train is strained.
In Train, the court said that subsection (b) of section 309 of the
FWCPA "authorizes," not commands, the EPA to issue an abate-
ment order.78 This, however, misconstrues the statute. A more
reasonable interpretation is the subsection (b) reference to "au-
thorizes," "means that the Administrator cannot act unless he
'finds' a violation of the Act."79 The Train court also said that be-
cause prosecuting is a discretionary decision, it would be unrea-
sonable to conclude that the Administrator's duty to first issue an
abatement order is mandatory. The abatement order would be an
"empty gesture" if the Administrator is not bound to ifie suit if
the order is disobeyed.8 0 The court in South Carolina Wildlife
correctly rebutted this hypothesis by saying that if no order was
issued at all, then even less would be done to "foster the goal of
pollution elimination." 81
Train in fact never mentions the goal of pollution elimination,
exemplifying its limited analysis of the entire FWPCA, and, in
particular, section 505. Congress intended that citizens be "un-
constrained" in bringing actions under section 505.82 According to
the Senate Report, the citizen-suit provision would ensure 'that
actions will lie against the Administrator for failure [to] exercise
his duties under the Act, including his enforcement duties."8 3
Train, then, limits the use of the citizen suit that has enormous
potential. In permitting citizen suits, Congress intended public in-
terest groups to have 1) a substantial role in helping the EPA
monitor violators,84 and 2) the ability to force the EPA to act
when political factors prevent effective enforcement.85 Both polit-
ical pressure and administrative delay now inhibit EPA enforce-
78. 557 F.2d at 490-91.
79. 457 F. Supp. at 133-34.
80. 557 F.2d at 490-91.
81. 457 F. Supp. at 133.
82. LEGISLATIvE HisTORY, .Yupra note 27, at 1498.
83. Id. at 1499 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 1498.
85. Id. at 1423.
ment.86 Elimination of water pollution would be greatly advanced
if public interest groups could sue the EPA when it was obvious
that abatement orders should be issued. Public interest groups,
though, are hesitant to use section 505 in this way in view of the
Train decision.87 Reluctance to challenge Train is probably wise
in light of a 1982 district court decision that closely followed
Train .88
Ironically, one of the Train court's reasons for its decision is
that, even when citizen suits under the FWPCA are limited, the
citizen has the alternative of directly bringing suit against and re-
ceiving damages from an alleged polluter.89 However, use of the
federal courts and FWPCA standards has been sharply curtailed
by recent Supreme Court decisions.9 0 Citizens are thus finding
that private methods of enforcing water pollution laws are being
cut off by the courts.
ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT-
NOT EFFECTIVE OR NOT THERE
Private Remedies
Several non-statutory remedies for water pollution were avail-
able in federal court prior to 1981. Recent Supreme Court deci-
sions, however, have eliminated the most important of these
remedies. In 1981, the Court denied relief to plaintiffs who had ar-
gued three remedial theories: an implied private remedy under
section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,91 a remedy under
federal common law for nuisance,92 and an implied remedy under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.93 Therefore, the alterna-
86. See Sheets & Taylor, The EPA: An Agency Reeling Under Siege, U.S. NEws
AND WoRLD REPORT, Feb. 28, 1983, at 24-26.
87. For example, James Banks, a senior attorney with the Natural Resources
Defense Council, indicated that his group was not willing to spend time and
money on this type of a suit because of the Train decision. Telephone interview
with James Banks, Senior Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council (Nov. 28,
1982).
88. Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co., 533 F. Supp. 252, 255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
89. Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d at 490-91.
90. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
91. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, § 10, ch. 425 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 403
(1976 & Supp. I 1979)); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (denied a pri-
vate remedy for potential damage to water quality, reasoning that the statute was
not originally intended for public nuisances).
92. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (held that
the FWPCA provision for citizen suits showed congressional intent to eliminate
common law remedies for water pollution).
93. Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981) (held that the inclusion of the citizen suit provision evinced a congressional
intent to preclude other private remedies).
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tive mentioned by Train94 for private citizens damaged by water
pollution is no longer available.95  Other alternatives often
stressed96 as substitutes for federal enforcement include state
common law and state statutes. Unfortunately, these alternatives
are seldom effective and have little impact on national97 water
pollution problems.
State Law Alternatives
State Common Law. Although plaintiffs may still resort to state
common-law remedies, the state laws do not contain the stringent
standards of the FWPCA.98 Also, the common law focused on ri-
parian rights and nuisances that allowed the plaintiff to recover
only for a "special injury."99 Common-law private actions are an
acceptable means of solving localized problems, 0 0 but they are
not a substitute for the more comprehensive standards and goals
outlined in the FWPCA.
State Statutes. Dependence on state statutes to clean up the
nation's waters would be a boon to industry. Industry's influence
is more direct and effective on local government than on Con-
gress.101 Local legislatures often base environmental quality deci-
sions on needs for economic growth and competition for
94. 557 F.2d at 490-91.
95. See Comment, Federal Water Pollution Remedies; Non-Statutory Remedies
are Eliminated, 17 LAND & WATER L REV. 105, 137 (1982). After a thorough exami-
nation of City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), and Mid-
dlesex County Sewage Auth. v. Natl Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), the
author concludes, "Since the FWPCA is a remedial statute, it is inconceivable that
Congress intended to insulate dischargers from liability for injuries caused by
their pollution. Yet the Court's recent decisions in Milwaukee II and Sea Clam-
mers effectively do just that."
96. See Enforcement by EPA, Ev'rL. SCL AND TECH., Feb., 1983, at 73A-74A.
"EPA repeatedly tries to justify its lack of enforcement activity on the grounds
that the states will step up enforcement while federal enforcement declines." The
article goes on to refute this proposition by stating that several states are cur-
rently reducing current funding for pollution and that federal grants to the states
will also be reduced. Id.
97. The FWPCA includes national standards for water pollution emissions as
well as national water quality goals. 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1976).
98. T. SCHOENBAUM, ENvmoNMNrAL PoucY LAw 680 (1982) (few states have
spt more stringent standards than the FWPCA and many states prohibit the set-
ting of standards more stringent than the FWPCA).
99. Comment, supra note 42, at 442.
100. Id.
101. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LmRARY OF CONGRESS, FED-
ERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN TRANSITION: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POUCY
IV (Comm. Print 1982).
industry. 02 A recent Library of Congress study suggests that re-
lying too much on state and local efforts could recreate the very
problems Congress sought to solve through water pollution
laws.l 0 3
PROPOSAL--CONMOLS OVER DISCRETION
A major congressional reason for the 1972 FWPCA amendments
was to overcome the "almost total lack of enforcement" under
previous acts.lO4 However, the problem of nonenforcement per-
sists because the EPA is unable or unwilling to prosecute viola-
tors. The inability to enforce stems from the EPA's lack of
guidelines and standards for its enforcement counsel. 05 The un-
willingness to enforce derives from the EPA's discretion not to
act. A curb on this discretion would help ensure the aggressive
enforcement needed to clean up the nation's waters.
Guidelines and Standards
EPA administrators should heed the Supreme Court's sensible
statement in Morton v. Ruiz: 'The power of an administrative
agency to administer a congressionally created ... program nec-
essarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of
rules to fill any gap left, impliedly or implicitly by the Con-
gress." 0 6 EPA decisions concerning enforcement are usually
made ad hoc and not subject to any standards.107 The EPA needs
to formulate policy guidelines that indicate when administrative
orders and civil suits should be filed.108 These guidelines should
be written by experienced EPA attorneys, stating the procedures
to be followed when dealing with the typical violation of a permit
or a standard. These procedures could leave room for necessary
case individualization, and innovation by regional attorneys.109
Another method of guiding discretion would be to require offi-
102. Id. at 42.
103. Id. at vii.
104. LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 27, at 163.
105. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
106. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231-32 (1974) (emphasis added).
107. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
108. See EnvtL Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(the court stated that administrative officers should be required to "articulate the
standards and principles that govern their discretionary decisions in as much de-
tail as possible").
109. "Every statute that requires enforcement would be supplemented with
rules that clarify enforcement policies, so that discretionary power to enforce or
not to enforce would not involve major policy-making but would be limited to
needed individualizing, guided by the rules that would be specific as possible
without cutting into needed individualizing." 2 K. DAvis, supra note 62, § 9.4, at
228.
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cials to give reasons for failure to prosecute. A policy requiring
memoranda justifying administrative decisions would make the
enforcement process more efficient and fair." 0 EPA attorneys in-
vestigating alleged polluters could use the experience and re-
search of other attorneys examining similar violations. Also,
unequal justice to dischargers would be prevented by the attor-
ney's use of the memoranda recorded in previous case files. Mak-
ing these files available to the alleged polluter would secure
similar treatment for dischargers dealing with different attorneys.
Those dischargers seeking to take advantage of non-enforcement
situations would be deterred because these memos are not legal
precedents"' preventing later prosecution.
Finally, private citizens could supplement EPA efforts if al-
lowed to examine case files. Upon determining areas where EPA
attorneys were less active, a private party could use the citizen-
suit provision" 2 to sue the discharger directly for violations of the
FWPCA or EPA regulations.
The EPA has, in certain situations, recorded and retained case
files on decisions not to prosecute. In 1981 the EPA withdrew
eleven civil actions 1 3 after referring them to the Department of
Justice." 4 The case files contained internal EPA memoranda and
written notations of conversations explaining the decisions to
withdraw from or continue action on a particular case. 15 Unfor-
110. Gardner, The Informal Actions of the Federal Government, 26 AM. U.L.,
REV. 799 (1977). Even after arguing that most standards for administrative agency
prosecutors are undesirable, the author makes the exception that "[i]t would
seem both practicable and desirable if the prosecuting attorney were put td a brief
explanation of his decision in every file closed without prosecution, and to send a
copy to his superior.. . ." Id. at 818.
111. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 9.10, at 267. "[Gluidelines or rules [by prose-
cutors] about nonenforcement or about selective enforcement therefore lack the
authoritative effect of legislation rules or statutes."
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976).
113. Letter from Harry R. Van Cleve, Acting General Counsel, U.S. General Ac-
counting Office, to Representative John Dingell (Apr. 9, 1982) (EPA enforcement
efforts).
114. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE EPA
NEEDED TO ENFORCE INDUSTRIAL COMPLIANCE WITH WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
DISCHARGE PERMITS (1978). The enforcement alternative available to the EPA is
outlined here. Generally after a notice of violation is issued to an alleged polluter,
the EPA will issue an administrative abatement order requiring abatement of the
pollution discharge. Next the EPA will make the decision to take civil or criminal
action and to refer the case to the Justice Department if the discharger has not
abated the pollution.
115. Letter from Henry . Van Cleve, Acting General Counsel, U.S. General Ac-
tunately, the EPA's enforcement office has not established a gen-
eral policy of requiring these case filesll6 and appears reluctant to
do so.
The trend prevailing in the courts, however, is to review infor-
mal actions and require a statement of reasons from administra-
tors making informal decisionsll7-such as the decisions not to
prosecute. For example, in Dunlop v. Bachowskil8 the Supreme
Court acknowledged that the Secretary of Labor has a degree of
discretion in selecting cases for prosecution, but nonetheless
ruled that its decisions were subject to judicial review. The court
also held that the Secretary must give written reasons for his de-
cision. Dunlop brought uniformity and openness to the Labor De-
partment's decision-making. An EPA official who has decided not
to prosecute should be held to Dunlop's requirements. As in
Dunlop, an EPA official would not be forced to prosecute but
would only be required to explain why he did not.
Discretion Not To Enforce
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis argues that "discretion not to en-
force is one of the main sources of injustice in our whole system
of law and government." 119 The enforcement counsel of the EPA
have used the power not to enforce at a crucial time of extensive
noncompliance 20 by dischargers. Discretionary enforcement
within the EPA is what Professor Davis calls the "dangerous"
power not to enforcel 2 1 for several reasons. First, decisions to en-
force are subject to further scrutiny but decisions not to enforce
counting Office to Representative John Dingell (Apr. 9, 1982) (EPA enforcement
efforts).
116. Telephone interview with Chris Dunsky, Office of Water Enforcement, En-
vironmental Protection Agency (Feb. 22, 1983); see also General Operating Proce-
dures, supra note 58, at 14. Regional counsels are directed to keep records on
cases so that a record exists for cases referred to the Justice Department. No
mention is made of decisions not to prosecute.
117. De Long, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65
VA. L. REv. 257 (1979); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-53 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); EnvtL Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439
F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
118. 421 U.S. 560 (1976).
119. K. DAVIs, ADunnsrATrvE LAw, CASEs--TEXTS--PROBLEMS 459 (1973). Pro-
fessor Davis has been described by many administrative law experts as the most
authoritative source on administrative discretion. E.g., K. WARREN, ADManisTRA-
TivE LAW iN THE AMERICAN POLrriCAL SYSTEM 318 (1982); Gardner, The Informal
Actions of the Federal Government, 26 Am. U.L. REV. 799, 814 (1977).
120. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
121. 2 K. DAvis, supra note 62, § 9.1, at 219. Professor Davis states that the dis-
cretion not to enforce is more dangerous than the power to enforce because it is
less controlled.
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are final.122 Second, decisions not to enforce are often made in se-
cret and not subject to standards.123 Finally, findings and reasons
often support enforcement decisions but are not required for dis-
cretionary decisions not to enforce.124
The hazards in general of a discretionary system and the EPA's
poor enforcement record suggest that the EPA should no longer
have discretion not to enforce. Congress should amend the
FWPCA and charge EPA officials with a mandatory duty to issue
abatement orders and issue civil suits if appropriate.125 The doc-
trine of mandatory enforcement has generally been rejected by
the American system, but there are exceptions which demon-
strate that such enforcement is deliberately chosen and can work
successfully. 26
Mandatory enforcement would protect the EPA from political
and economic pressures that interfere with the EPA's duty to pro-
tect the environment. Removing enforcement discretion would
also provide people with the right to use the citizen suit to compel
the EPA to carry out the mandatory duty to enforce.127 A similar
citizen-suit provision in the Clean Air Act has been used to force
EPA officials to act where they had been delaying enforcement by
122. Decisions to prosecute are subject to review from regional counsel, re-
gional administrators, enforcement counsel, and assistant administrators in Wash-
ington. There is no provision in the Operating Procedures for review of non-
enforcement decisions. General Operating Procedures, supra note 58, at 10-11.
123. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
124. Telephone interview with Chris Dunsky, Water Compliance Division, Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (Feb. 22, 1983). A regional counsel said that there
was no requirement of stated reasons in her regional office as well. Telephone in-
terview with Mary Ann Muirhead, Assistant Regional Counsel, Region IX, Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (Dec. 28, 1982).
125. Generally a "Notice of Violation" will first be sent to a discharger inform-
ing him that he is in violation of the law. If compliance is not achieved through
negotiations, then the Administrator may issue a formal order which mandates
compliance within a certain period of time. Should the discharger fail to comply
with terms of the order, the EPA may seek enforcement of that order in a United
States District Court.'See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MORE EFFECT=rv Ac-
TION BY THE EPA NEEDED TO ENFORCE INDUSTRIAL COMPLIANCE wrrH WATER POL-
LUTION CONTROL DISCHARGE PERmrrs (1978). This proposal would mandate that
the EPA seek judicial enforcement of an order that has not been obeyed. Excep-
tions could be made where dischargers had complied or consent decrees had been
issued by the courts.
126. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 9.7, at 233 (Air Pollution Prevention and Con-
trol Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. V 1981)).
127. Under the citizen suit provision, citizens can sue the EPA to compel them
to perform non-discretionary duties. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c) (2) (1976).
negotiations with dischargers.128 A mandatory enforcement provi-
sion would eliminate many of the delays 2 9 in "restoring the in-
tegrity of the Nations' waters." 30
CONCLUSION
The significant changes in the enforcement provisions of the
1972 Amendments to the FWPCA symbolized congressional deter-
mination to clean up the nation's waters. Unfortunately, these
provisions have failed to provide the effective enforcement
needed to reach the water quality goals of the FWPCA on sched-
ule. In fact, several of the pollution problems deemed dangerous
in the early 1970's still plague the nation's waters today.'13
By reducing discretionary enforcement powers within the EPA,
Congress can establish more accountable and effective enforce-
ment. Congress should enact now what was suggested over a
decade ago:132 a mandatory enforcement provision backed by a
citizen-suit provision to force water pollution control officials to
carry out their duties.
EDWARD E. YATES
128. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 902 (1976).
129. Standards set up for municipal and nonmunicipal discharges in the 1972
amendments were not met by the July 1, 1977 deadline. Of the national total of
4,101 major nonmunicipal dischargers, 16 percent failed to comply with the dead-
line. 1977 Fed'l Laws, ErNv'T REP. (BNA) 41"2301. Congress was forced to enact
major amendments to the Act to modify the 1977 and 1983 discharge deadlines.
Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. I No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976).
131. See D. ZwIcK & M. BENSTOCr, WATER WASTELAND 5-23 (1972). The authors
detail problems of chemicals in food chains and water supplies that existed in the
early 1970's. These problems still remain as described supra notes 10-12.
132. Id. at 395-96.
